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ABUSING THE PATIENT:
MEDICARE FRAUD AND ABUSE
AND HOSPITAL-PHYSICIAN
INCENTIVE PLANS

The Medicare 1 prospective payment system (PPS), 2 enacted
in 1983, fundamentally restructured the method of government
reimbursement to hospitals for care of Medicare inpatients. 3 The
PPS uses diagnosis related groups (DRGs)• to fix amounts for
reimbursing hospitals for treatment provided under the Medicare system. Upon admitting a Medicare patient, a hospital assigns her to a particular DRG. The DRG assigned entitles the
hospital to receive a predetermined amount for that inpatient's
care. Thus, the payment does not vary according to the severity
of the patient's illness, the length of the patient's stay, or the
unique characteristics of the particular patient's case. 5 If a hospital can treat and discharge a patient at a cost less than the set
rate of reimbursement, the hospital will make a profit on that
1. The Medicare provisions of the Social Security Act provide medical benefits for
qualified persons. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395zz (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
2. The PPS went into effect October 1, 1983. The Department of Health and Human
Services administers the program. 42 C.F.R pt. 412 (1986).
3. See infra notes 10-23 and accompanying text.
4. DRGs originally categorized a patient into one of 467 groups, based upon such
factors as patient age, principal diagnosis, complicating conditions, and type of surgery
required. STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, BACKGROUND INFORMATION RELATING
TO MEDICARE HOSPITAL PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT PROPOSAL REPORTED TO CONGRESS BY SEC·
RETARY RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER 3 (1983) [hereinafter SENATE FINANCE CoMM. PPS REPORT], reprinted in 1 Hospital Prospective Payment System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 6 (1983)
[hereinafter 1 PPS Hearing]; 42 C.F.R. § 412.60(c)(l) (1986). For the most recent list of
473 DRGs, see Medicare Program; Changes to the Inpatient Hospital Prospective Payment System and Fiscal Year 1987 Rates, 51 Fed. Reg. 31,454, 31,561-74 (1986).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(A)(i)-(ii) (Supp. III 1985) allows for additional reimbursement where the length of a patient's stay exceeds the calculated mean length-ofstay for all patients with a particular diagnosis by a specified number of days or by a
fixed number of standard deviations, whichever is fewer. Also, if charges exceed the DRG
reimbursement by a fixed dollar amount or by a fixed multiple of the PPS rate to be
determined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, whichever is greater, additional reimbursement is possible. 42 C.F.R. § 412.80(a) (1986).
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patient. If not, the hospital breaks even or must absorb any
costs above the reimbursement rate. 6
Hospitals have developed several strategies for maintaining
their financial position under the PPS. These include educating
physicians on the costs of patient care7 and engaging in joint
ventures. 8 This Note focuses on a third strategy, hospital-physician incentive plans.
Incentive plans encourage physicians to minimize hospital
utilization of ancillary services and decrease length-of-stay for
Medicare inpatients. By giving the participating physician financial rewards for reducing patient care costs, the plans offer the
physician a significant stake in the cost-containment process.
This Note examines the desirability of using incentive plans
under the PPS. The Note argues that incentive plans are inappropriate cost-containment measures because they violate the
Medicare fraud and abuse provisions 9 and encourage abusive
practices that clearly outweigh any financial benefits that result
from their use.
Part I provides a background discussion of the PPS, DRGs,
and incentive plans. Part II focuses on the fraud and abuse provisions of the Medicare statute and argues that incentive plans
violate the plain language · of the statute, which prohibits any
knowing and willful remuneration for the inducement of referrals. Part III concentrates on the fraudulent and abusive practices that incentive plans encourage. The plans frustrate legislative intent because they encourage practices that subvert the
cost-containment purposes of the PPS and have an adverse effect on patient care.
I.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM AND
CosT CoNSCIOUSNEss

Prior to 1983, Medicare reimbursed hospitals for inpatient
care according to the actual reasonable cost of services ren6. 42 C.F.R. § 412.l(a) (1986); see infra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
7. For descriptions of various programs of physician education, see Berger, Physician
Involvement in Hospital Cost Control: Leaders in the Field Talk About Their Programs, HosP. F., Mar.-Apr. 1983, at 17.
8. See Carpenter, Finding the Shoe that Fits: Opportunities in the Marketplace of
PPOs, HMOs, and DRGs, HosP. F., Sept.-Oct. 1984, at 14; Ellwood, When MDs Meet
DRGs: Physicians Searching for a Response to Prospective Pricing May Find Hospitals
Their Best Allies, HOSPITALS, Dec. 16, 1983, at 62, 62-64, 66; Richards, Nothing Ventured, Nothing Gained, HOSP. MED. STAFF, Jan. 1985, at 5.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see infra note 47.
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dered. 1° Congressional amendments to the Medicare statute in
1983, 11 however, providing for prospective reimbursement, drastically altered the method of reimbursing hospitals for care of
these Medicare patients. 12
A.

Prospective Payment

The purpose of the PPS was to contain burgeoning health
care costs. 13 As the number of elderly patients qualifying for
Medicare increased in recent years, u and as medical costs
skyrocketed,1 11 the Medicare system faced serious financial difficulties and even possible insolvency. 16 In 1983, Congress enacted
the PPS as one possible solution. An integral part of that system
was the DRG.
10. Id. § 1395ww (1982) (amended 1983).
11. Social Security Amendments Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, tit. VI, 97 Stat. 65,
149-72 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (Supp. Ill 1985)).
12. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
13. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS FOR EVALUATING THE
IMPACTS OF MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT OF POST-HOSPITAL LONG-TERM-CARE SERVICES: PRELIMINARY REPORT 1 (1985), reprinted in Sustaining Quality Health Care
Under Cost Containment: Joint Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on Aging and
the Task Force on the Rural Elderly of the House Select Comm. on Aging, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. app. at 102, 102 (1985) [hereinafter Joint Hearing on Quality Health Care]; see
also Matsui, Medicare Payment Policy Needs Corrections, 254 J. A.M.A. 2454 (1985)
(member of Congress explaining his reasons for supporting a pause in the transition to
national DRG rates).
14. See 0. Hatch, Health Care Costs: A Discussion Paper, reprinted in Health Care
Cost: Defining the Issues, 1983: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 9-10 (1983) [hereinafter Health Care Cost
Hearings); see also A. SORKIN, HEALTH CARE AND THE CHANGING ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
56 (1986).
15. Expenditures for health care currently represent over one-tenth of the gross national product, more than double the comparable fraction in 1950. A. SORKIN, supra note
14, at 5, 6, Table 2-1. Federal expenditures through the Medicare and Medicaid programs increased an average of 17% per year between 1968 and 1983. Id. at 72; see H.R.
REP. No. 404, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 1-2 (1979); see also SENATE FINANCE COMM.
PPS REPORT, supra note 4, at 3 ("In FY 1967, medicare paid $3.2 billion for hospital
services; in FY 1983, medicare will pay over $37 billion. Medicare expenditures for hospital care have increased 19 percent per year during the last 3 years."), reprinted in 1 PPS
Hearing, supra note 4, at 5. Richard Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Services, projected that Medicare expenditures under cost-based reimbursement for hospital
services would reach $44.7 billion in 1984 and $58.4 billion in 1985. 1 PPS Hearing,
supra note 4, at 17, 20. Within the health care sector, hospital costs increase most rapidly, primarily due to the costs of inputs, which include food, labor, and supplies, the
basic hotel services a hospital provides. A. SORKIN, supra note 14, at 73.
16. Health Care Cost Hearings, supra note 14, at 33 (statement of Margaret Heckler,
Secretary of Health and Human Services, that the Medicare Hospital Insurance Trust
Fund will be insolvent in 1990 despite the PPS); A. SORKIN, supra note 14, at 53-56 &
Tables 4-3, 4-4.
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B. Diagnosis Related Groups
Department of Health and Human Services regulations implemented DRGs, a key element in the new system. 17 Instead of
reimbursement on a cost basis, DRGs reflect the average cost of
care for patients with a particular diagnosis. 18 The Health Care
Financing Administration (HCF A) calculates DRGs on the basis
of the average cost of care per diagnosis. 18 The assigned DRG
establishes a fixed price for the total treatment rendered by an
acute care facility 20 to a Medicare inpatient. HCFA expects most
hospitals, with some effort expended towards cost containment,
to break even on the aggregate costs of caring for their Medicare
inpatients. 21
Under the PPS, a hospital earns a profit only if it discharges
the patient at a cost lower than the DRG rate of reimbursement
for that particular patient's illness. Thus, DRGs encourage acute
care facilities to decrease spending for care of all Medicare patients to balance the expense of the uncompensated longer stays.
If a Medicare patient stays in the hospital longer and incurs
more charges than allowed by the assigned DRG, the hospital
will suffer a loss. 22 Thus, the PPS allows a hospital to break
even, make a profit, or suffer a loss on care provided to any particular Medicare patient.
17. 42 C.F.R. §§ 412.60-.63 (1986). DRGs are modeled upon a system first developed
at Yale University. R. BUCHANAN & J. MINOR, LEGAL ASPECTS OF HEALTH CARE REIMBURSEMENT 31 (1985).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(2)-(4) (Supp. III 1985). The actual dollar value assigned to
any particular DRG will vary from one hospital to another as the Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA) takes into account such variables as geographic location and
area wage levels. 42 C.F.R. § 412.63(g)-(h) (1986).
19. Congress recognized that under the PPS, some patients would be treated at a cost
less than the DRG rate and some would not. The basic idea was to give hospital management an incentive to control costs. 1 PPS Hearing, supra note 4, at 18 (statement of
Richard S. Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Servs.).
20. The PPS exempts certain hospitals-psychiatric hospitals, rehabilitation hospitals, children's hospitals, and hospitals in which the average length-of-stay is greater
than 25 days-from its coverage. In addition, DRGs do not cover distinct portions of a
hospital constituting psychiatric or rehabilitation units. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(l)(B)
(Supp. III 1985). As a result, Medicare reimburses these hospitals, or portions of hospitals, on a reasonable cost basis. 42 C.F.R. § 412.22(b) (1986).
21. See Medicare Program; Prospective Payments for Medicare Inpatient Hospital
Services, 48 Fed. Reg. 39,752, 39,805 (1983).
22. For instance, the average national DRG payment rate for a hip replacement without complications in 1983 was $4500. 1 PPS Hearing, supra note 4, at 49 (statement of
Richard S. Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Servs.). A hospital, reimbursed at
this rate, would receive $4500 for treating a hip replacement patient, regardless of actual
cost.
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DRG reimbursement encourages hospitals to develop in-house
cost-containment measures. If higher-cost hospitals do not make
a profit or at least break even on patients insured through Medicare, they face serious financial difficulties or insolvency. 23 The
amount of services provided to patients is key to controlling
costs.

C.

Hospital-Physician Incentive Plans

Hospitals provide the equipment and manpower necessary for
physicians to care for patients, but the physician orders the variety of services provided each patient. 2 • Because doctors control
the type and quantity of care administered, they determine
whether a hospital will make or lose money under the PPS on
any given Medicare patient. 211 Physicians' decisions regarding
patient discharges and use of ancillary services, such as laboratory work, x-rays, and other diagnostic testing, affect the hospital's ability to break even or earn a profit under the PPS. Thus,
hospitals' efforts at cost containment depend on the cost-effective behavior of their physicians. 26 The PPS does not encompass
23. By one commentator's estimation, a majority of the country's hospitals achieved
record profits in the first quarter of 1985. Eighteen percent of all hospitals are, however,
suffering losses. Lefton, Hospitals Score Record Profits Under DRGs, Am. Med. News,
Aug. 9, 1985, at 1, col. 1. Donald Wegmiller, chairman-elect of the American Hospital
Association (AHA), predicted that one-half of that 18~,•• or over 500 of 5800 hospitals in
the country, will close in the next few years. Id. But see Frederick, How You'll Feel the
Money Squeeze on Hospitals, MED. EcoN., Feb. 4, 1985, at 117 (denying the claim that
substantial numbers of hospitals are facing bankruptcy under the DRGs); Tichon, Krieger, Chinn, Volk & Robinow, Medicare: Do DRG's Diminish the Quality of Care?, 8
WHITTIER L. REV. 427, 430 (1986) [hereinafter Do DRGs Diminish the Quality of Care?]
(transcript of panel discussion presented at the Fifth Annual Whittier Health Law Symposium, Whittier College School of Law, Mar. 14, 1986) (asserting that hospitals are
making more money under the PPS than they did under cost-based reimbursement).
24. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 404, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 69 (1979) (dissenting
views on the favorable reporting out of the Hospital Cost Containment Act of 1979);
Mushlin, Measuring Cost and Quality of Care Under Prospective Reimbursement,
HosP. MED. STAFF, June 1984, at 17.
25. For example, if a physician treating a patient for a hip replacement, see supra
note 22, treated the patient at a cost to the hospital of less than $4500, the hospital
would make a profit. On the other hand, if the cost of the various procedures together
with the cost of room and board exceeded $4500, the hospital would have to absorb the
loss. Cf. Mariner, Diagnosis Related Groups: Evading Social llesponsibility?, 12 LAW
MED. & HEALTH CARE 243 (1984) (suggesting that physicians are inappropriate decisionmakers for health care rationing).
26. "[E]fficient hospital operation requires close cooperation between hospital administrators and physician staff.... [l]t is the physician who makes most of the decisions on
patient care. A hospital will not be able to live within Medicare's prospective payment
unless its physicians are willing to economize." R. Rubin, in DRG's-What's Next? Two
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physician reimbursement. 27 Instead, Medicare reimburses physicians on the basis of reasonable, customary, and prevailing
charges. 28 Under this system, physicians receive what Medicare
deems appropriate compensation for the services provided.
To promote conservative use of facilities, some hospitals have
devised plans that encourage physicians to practice in accordance with the DRG rates. 29 These incentive plans give physicians a greater personal financial stake 30 in the cost-containment
process and provide an incentive for them to keep patient care
costs down. Under one form of hospital-physician incentive plan,
when a physician treats a patient at a cost below the DRG rate
of reimbursement, the physician will receive a share of the hospital's profits on that patient. 31
Hollywood Community Hospital32 recently implemented such
a plan. Under Hollywood Community's plan, the hospital, when
Views 7 (text of seminar sponsored by the Mount Sinai School of Medicine, Department
of Health Care Management (1984)) (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.); see Ellwood,
supra note 8; Jessee & Suver, Physicians and DRGs: Survival Under PPS, HosP. MED.
STAFF, Apr. 1984, at 2-3; Richman, Physician Incentive Plan Study May Give Guidance,
Moo. HEALTHCARE, July 19, 1985, at 48.
27. Congress has considered a system similar to the PPS to govern physician reimbursement. Lundberg, How Should Physicians Be Paid?, 254 J. AM.A. 2638 (1985).
28. 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.501-.508, .551 (1986). See A. SORKIN, supra note 14, at 48-49, for
a brief discussion of physician reimbursement under Medicare.
29. An additional reason for the plans is that hospitals, now competing for physicians
in order to increase revenues, are striving to attract the best doctors possible. See Richards, supra note 8, at 9. The financial attractiveness of incentive plans is one way to
draw those physicians who can make the most money for the hospital. See A. SORKIN,
supra note 14, at 83-84.
30. Many physicians, such as surgeons, rely on hospitals for their practice and livelihood. Ellwood, supra note 8, at 62-63.
31. This type of incentive plan rewards each physician on an individual basis. Each
physician's additional compensation for cost-effective behavior is determined per patient. Other hospitals could implement plans on other bases. For example, hospitals
could reward physicians according to the hospital's profits on all of the particular physician's patients. The form of incentive could also vary. The hospital may choose to reward
her with better equipment, see Chenen, Prospective Payment Can Put You in Court,
MED. EcoN., July 1984, at 134, 141, or decreased rental rates on office space, see A.
SORKIN, supra note 14, at 89.
Still other plans may reward the individual physician on her own performance or a
group of physicians for their overall cost-effective behavior. See Note, The Medicare Rx:
Prospective Pricing to Effect Cost Containment, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 743 (1986) (advocating an indirect, aggregate approach to physician incentives). Distinctions among incentives make little difference in the analysis of the fraud and abuse problem, see infra
Part II, except perhaps in the degree to which abuse is encouraged, and this Note will
not differentiate among them.
32. Located in Hollywood, California, Hollywood Community Hospital is part of the
Paracelsus Healthcare Corp. (Pasadena, California) chain. Richman, supra note 26, at
48. As of July 1985, 12 of the Paracelsus group of 14 hospitals had implemented similar
plans. Id. A "good number" of physicians participate in the Hollywood Community incentive plan. Id.
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it discharges a Medicare patient, calculates the retail charges,
including room, board, and other charges, it would have billed
had the patient been privately insured or self-paying. If a Medicare DRG payment exceeds seventy-five percent of what the
hospital would have charged a private patient, the attending
physician, who has chosen to participate in the program, receives a percentage of the excess over that seventy-five percent. 33
The purpose of Hollywood Community's program was to encourage its physicians to be more cost-conscious while providing
quality care.a. The hospital expected to achieve cost savings by
encouraging physicians to decrease patient length-of-stay and to
use fewer ancillary services. Hollywood Community anticipated
that the "Savings Program" would not compromise the quality
of care given in the institution. 3 ~ Nevertheless, the Department
of Health and Human Services Regional Inspector General36 is
investigating the effects of the Savings Program on patient
care. 37
Incentive plans represent one of the first efforts at profit sharing38 in the health care industry. In the past, health care providers avoided profit-sharing arrangements primarily because physicians consider the practice unethical. 39 The American Medical
33.

The formula for Hollywood Community's incentive payments is as follows:

If the Amount of the

Medicare Payment Falls
within the Range of
the Following Percentages
of Retail Charges
75-85(';,
85-95~,.
95:i, and greater

Then the Hospital
Would Pay the Physician the
Following Percentage of the
Amount within Each Such Range
10%
15%
20%

Hollywood Community Hosp., Program Statement 1 (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L.
REF.).

34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Richman, supra note 26, at 48. This investigation was initiated at the request of
the American Medical Association (AMA) and is examining the effects of the plan, including impacts on quality of care. Telephone interview with Donald Goldman, attorney
for Hollywood Community Hospital (Feb. 10, 1986) [hereinafter Goldman interview]. For
a discussion of the AMA's primary objections to the incentive plan, see infra text accompanying notes 93-98.
37. Richman, supra note 26, at 53. The Hollywood Community Hospital expects "a
clean bill of health" from the Regional Inspector General regarding the impact on quality of care. Goldman interview, supra note 36.
38. The terminology used, be it "profit sharing," "risk sharing," or "kickback," see
infra Part II, is of little consequence, so this Note uses the term with the least objectionable connotation.
39. "The AMA evidently sees [risk-sharing arrangements] as a form of fee splitting,
in which the hospital makes some money from its physicians' behavior.... In fact, many
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Association (AMA) has long regarded the practice of fee splitting as improper: 40 "[P]hysicians are not entitled to derive a
profit that results directly or indirectly from services delivered
by other health care providers who are not their employees or
agents. " 41
Another reason health care providers did not implement
profit-sharing programs more quickly was lack of necessity and
incentive in the former system of cost-based reimbursement.• 2
Under cost-based reimbursement, hospitals had little incentive
to control the amount of care administered because the reimbursement received covered the full reasonable amount of care
provided. 43 The same was and remains true of physician reimbursement. Medicare reimburses physicians according to usual,
reasonable, and customary fees. 0 Thus, the more care provided,
the greater the physician's gross income. There is no incentive in
the PPS itself to control physician costs because the PPS does
not affect physician reimbursement. 411
Although incentive plans may encourage cost-effective behavior in physicians, these plans and similar forms of profit sharing
face a formidable obstacle: the language of the fraud and abuse
provisions46 of the Medicare statute.

states have incorporated statutory opposition to fee splitting into their medical practice
acts." Friedman, The Lure of Risk-Sharing Arrangements, HosP. MED. STAFF, Jan. 1985,
at 27 (interview with William F. Jessee, M.D.).
40. Id.
41. Judicial Council, AMA, 38th Interim Meeting, Report D-Ethical Implications of
Hospital-Physician Risk-Sharing Arrangements Under DRGs (Dec. 2-5, 1984) [hereinafter Judicial Council, Report D] (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.), reprinted in 253 J.
A.M.A. 2425 (1985).
42. H.R. REP. No. 404, supra note 15, at 26; see 1 PPS Hearing, supra note 4, at 16
(statement of Richard S. Schweiker, Secretary of Health and Human Servs.); Goldsmith,
Entrepreneurship: Its Place in Health Care, HosP. F., Mar.-Apr. 1984, at 17 (suggesting
that adaptation to the new competitive era in health care provision necessitates the
adoption of entrepreneurial values); Lowenstein, Iezzoni & Moskowitz, Prospective Payment for Physician Services: Impact on Medical Consultation Practices, 254 J. A.M.A.
2632, 2633 (1985) (describing possible effects of proposed physician DRGs on consultation practices).
43. See supra text accompanying note 10.
44.

See supra note 28 and accompanying text.

45. Jessee & Suver, supra note 26, at 3.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see infra note 47.
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THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE FRAUD AND ABUSE PROVISIONS

The plain language of the fraud and abuse provisions47 is consistent with the premise that hospitals and physicians, in offering and accepting, respectively, the financial rewards of hospitalphysician incentive plans, violate the Social Security Act. Under
the plans, hospitals knowingly and willfully48 pay a monetary remuneration49 to physicians. Through such payments, the hospitals induce physicians to refer certain Medicare patients to these
hospitals and to order or arrange for goods and services for those
patients in a particular fashion. 110
Thus, hospital-physician incentive plans can violate the provisions of the fraud and abuse statute dealing with illegal remuneration in several ways. First, physicians violate the provisions
when they knowingly and willfully receive remuneration in return for referring patients to the offering hospital111 for the costeffective ordering of goods or services paid for by Medicare. 112
The hospital violates the provisions by offering or paying a re47. Id. The provisions governing the legality of incentive plans are as follows:
(b) Illegal remunerations
(1) Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly,
in cash or in kind(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the furnishing
or arranging for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment
may be made in whole or in part under this subchapter, or
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or recommending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or
item for which payment may be made in whole or in part under this
subchapter,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more
than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
(2) Whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in
cash or in kind to any person to induce such person(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging
for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be
made in whole or in part under this subchapter, or
(B) to purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recommend purchasing,
leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for which payment may be made in whole or in part under this subchapt.er,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more
than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
Id. § 1395nn(h)(l)-(2) (1982).
48. See infra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 55-68 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(l)(A) (1982).
52. Id. § 1395nn(b)(l)(B).
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muneration to induce physicians to refer patients to the hospital
for services paid for by Medicare. 53 Finally, the hospital violates
the statute by offering or paying a remuneration to induce physicians to order or arrange for goods or services paid for by
Medicare.Ii• Thus, "remuneration," "referral," and "knowing and
willful" are key terms in establishing fraud and abuse.
A.

Remuneration

Congress added the term "any remuneration" in 1977 in order
to clarify the former language.H Originally, the statute simply
proscribed kickbacks, bribes, and rebates.li 6 Courts encountered
numerous cases exemplifying definitional problems with the
original language.li7 The addition of the words "any remunera53. Id. § 1395nn(b)(2)(A).
54. Id. § 1395nn(b)(2)(B). This Note will not discuss this aspect of the statutory violation in depth. The plans themselves are intended and designed specifically to have the
prohibited effect. Physicians accept rewards in return for the encouraged behavior. The
violations are obvious. See, e.g., the discussion of Hollywood Community Hospital's Savings Program, supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
55. Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-142, sec.
4, 91 Stat. 1175, 1179, 1180 (1977) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(l)-(2)
(1982)); see SuBCOMM. ON HEALTH OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 95TH CONG.,
1ST SESS., H.R. 3: MEDICARE-MEDICAID ANTI-FRAUD AND ABUSE AMENDMENTS 8-10 (Comm.
Print 1977).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b) (1976) (amended 1977).
57. One such case is United States v. Porter, 591 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1979). Porter
involved a laboratory operator convicted, under the original language, of offering kickbacks or bribes to physicians in exchange for referrals. The defendant had paid "handling fees" of $35 to induce physicians to refer patients to his laboratory. These fees
were allegedly paid for interpretation of results, for which Medicare paid less than six
dollars per patient. Id. at 1051. The defendant appealed, claiming his actions did not
come within the statutory terms "kickback" and "bribe."
In reversing the conviction, the Fifth Circuit stated that, absent a statutory definition
of relevant terms, they are assumed to be used as they are commonly and ordinarily
understood. The court understood "bribe" to encompass "acts that are malum in se because they entail either a breach of trust or duty or the corrupt selling of what our
society deems not to be legitimately for sale." Id. at 1053 (quoting United States v.
Zacher, 586 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir. 1978)). The court defined "kickback" as a "secret
return to an earlier possessor of part of a sum received." Id. at 1054 (emphasis in original). Perhaps this narrow definition of kickback was what Congress attempted to correct
when it clarified the statutory language.
The majority of cases after Porter reject its narrow definitions. See, e.g., United States
v. Hancock, 604 F.2d 999, 1002 (7th Cir.) ("We cannot agree that the term kickback is
limited to a return of funds to an earlier possessor. The term is commonly used and
understood to include 'a percentage payment ... for granting assistance by one in a
position to open up or control a source of income.'") (quoting Webster's Dictionary),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991 (1979); see also United States v. Weingarden, 468 F. Supp.
410, 412 (E.D. Mich. 1979), aff'd, 625 F.2d 111 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1034
(1980).
In United States v. Zacher, 586 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1978), the court reversed the conviction of a nursing home operator convicted of receiving bribes from families of Medicaid
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tion" in 1977, however, significantly broadened the scope of the
fraud and abuse provisions. Because Congress did not define the
term "remuneration," the word must be interpreted in light of
its common and ordinary meaning. 118
"Remuneration" is generally defined as a reward or compensation,69 or as a payment for services. 60 Under this definition, incentive plans plainly come within the language of the Fraud and
Abuse Amendments. Through such incentive plans, hospitals
give physicians a bonus in addition to Medicare's payment for
the physicians' services rendered. 61
In the legislative history of the Fraud and Abuse Amendments
of 1977, Congress announced no intent to deter new activities by
the addition of "remuneration" but instead discussed the same
types of abuses that led to the original enactment of the fraud
and abuse statute. 62 Although this may suggest that Congress
did not intend to prohibit practices such as profit sharing, Congress must have understood the significant ramifications of the
patients. Id. at 913. Section 1909 of the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396h (1982), contains
a provision identical to the Medicare fraud and abuse statute. In deciding the case, the
Second Circuit considered the proper meaning and connotation of "kickback" and
"bribe." The court concluded that the terms kickback, rebate, and bribe connote "a corrupt payment or receipt of payment in violation of the duty imposed by Congress on
providers of services to use federal funds only for intended purposes and only in the
approved manner." 586 F.2d at 916. For a discussion of these and other cases decided
before the addition to the statute of the words "any remuneration," see Comment, Physician Fraud in the Medicare-Medicaid Programs-Kickbacks, Bribes, and Remunerations, 10 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 684 (1980).
58. See Porter, 591 F.2d at 1053. The "Plain Meaning Rule" of statutory construction requires that courts first examine the language of a statute. If the meaning of the
statute is plain, "the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms."
2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01, at 73 (Sands
4th ed. 1984) (citing Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917)).
59. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1165 (5th ed. 1979).
60. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 971 (1979).
61. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
62. Among the most prevalent types of fraud Congress sought to discourage was the
"Medicaid mill." The Medicaid mill is typically an inner-city facility deriving most of its
business from Medicare and Medicaid patients. The most common types of mill violations include medically unfounded referrals within the mill, billing for multiple services
to family members who did not seek treatment, billing for services more extensive than
those actually provided, directing a patient to a particular pharmacy, and billing for services not rendered. H.R. REP. No. 393, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 45, reprinted in
1977 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 3039, 3047-48. Also discussed in the legislative history
were violations by clinical laboratories, independent practitioners, and nursing homes.
Id. at 46-47, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 3048-50; see 1 Medicare
and Medicaid Frauds: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Long-Term Care and the
Subcomm. on Health of the Elderly of the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 40 (1975) [hereinafter 1 Medicare and Medicaid Frauds Hearing] (statement of
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addition of the words "any remuneration."63 The use of such a
broad term suggests that Congress intended to expand the coverage of the statute, perhaps to cover more than the most blatant forms of Medicare fraud and abuse. Congress did not distinguish between "good" remuneration and "bad" remuneration.H Rather, it declared "any remuneration" a violation of
the statute. 611
The Third Circuit's recent interpretation of the fraud and
abuse provisions in United States v. Greber66 supports this conPaul M. Allen, Chief Deputy Director, Michigan Dep't of Social Servs., regarding Medicaid fraud).
The most costly, noncriminal abuse identified in the Medicare system was the furnishing of excessive services. H.R. REP. No. 393, supra, at 47, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CooE
CoNG. & Ao. NEWS at 3050. For further discussion, see generally 1 Medicare and Medicaid Frauds Hearing, supra; 2 Medicare and Medicaid Frauds: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Long-Term Care of the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1975); H.R. REP. No. 393, supra, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CooE CoNG. & Ao. NEWS 3039.
See also Tepper, Medicare and Medicaid Fraud, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 286, 288-89
(1980).
63. "It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that effect must be given, if
possible, to every word, clause and sentence of a statute." 2A N. SINGER, supra note 58, §
46.06, at 104 (quoting State v. Bartley, 39 Neb. 353, 58 N.W. 172 (1894)).
64. See supra note 62.
65. This assertion becomes less plausible, however, when one examines the implications of such a literal reading of the statute. For example, under a strict literal interpretation, a hospital could be found in violation of the Amendments for simply receiving
Medicare funds. The hospital would be knowingly and willfully soliciting remuneration
directly and overtly in cash in return for ordering or arranging for a service for which
payment may be made by Medicare. This result is surely absurd, but follows from a
strict literal reading. A similar reading of that part of the statute that prohibits the
offering or paying of remuneration to induce referrals, 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(2) (1982),
see supra note 47, would create doubt as to the legality of the government's reimbursement of hospitals and physicians as this type of remuneration induces such parties to
order or arrange for the ordering of services for Medicare patients.
These examples seem to indicate that Congress, when using the words any remuneration, did not mean to imply that, regardless of the form or intent, if money changes
hands the transaction is illegal. Congress clearly intended, however, to include all but the
absurd readings. Under § 1395nn(b)(3)(B), "any amount paid by an employer to an employee (who has a bona fide employment relationship with such employer) for employment in the provision of covered items or services" is excluded from the coverage of the
provisions dealing with illegal remunerations. Congress' specific exclusion of employeremployee relationships from the statute's coverage suggests that any other such payment
relationship, including hospital-physician incentive plans, falls within its prohibitions on
remuneration. For an interpretation of the word "remuneration" written prior to United
States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 396 (1985), discussed
infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text, see Comment, supra note 57, at 693-95.
66. 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 396 (1985). The facts of Greber are
typical of Medicare fraud cases involving referrals in that the defendant was one of the
bad actors that the statute was enacted to cover. See, e.g., United States v. Duz-Mor
Diagnostic Laboratory, 650 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Hancock, 604 F.2d
999 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991 (1979); United States v. Porter, 591 F.2d 1048
(5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Weingarden, 468 F. Supp. 410 (E.D. Mich. 1979), a{f'd

FALL

1986)

Medicare Fraud and Abuse

291

clusion. To date, this is the only case to shed light on the meaning of "any remuneration." Greber involved "kickbacks" to referring physicians of forty percent of the Medicare receipts on
the referring physicians' patients. A jury convicted Greber, an
osteopathic physician, of violating the Medicare fraud statute. 87
On appeal, the Third Circuit defined "any remuneration" to include "not only sums for which no actual service was performed
but also those amounts for which some professional time was expended."88 Here, the court broadly interpreted "any remuneration" in its determination of whether payments are illegal.
Under the Greber court's interpretation of the statutory language, the transfer of Medicare funds from one physician to another is illegal. Defendants cannot attempt to insulate themselves from criminal liability by claiming that the transfer of
funds constituted payment for services rendered. In applying
this line of reasoning to the relationship between a hospital and
physician created by incentive plans, clearly the hospital pays
the nonemployee physicians for professional services-the costeffective use of hospital resources in patient care. Nevertheless,
this relationship does not shield the participants in an incentive
plan from liability.
B.

Referrals

The Medicare fraud statute also requires that the remuneration be offered to induce a person to refer, and be received for
referring, Medicare patients to a particular provider. Incentive
plans satisfy this requirement by inducing physicians to refer
Medicare patients to the hospital offering the incentive. 89 Consider the following hypothetical: Doctor A practices in a city of
moderate size with several hospitals, two of which, Hospitals X
and Y, have granted the doctor admitting and staff privileges. 70
Doctor A is a thoracic surgeon and has a booming practice in
these days of high anxiety. Hospital X recently implemented an
incentive plan in order to combat the adverse financial effects of
sub nom. United States v. Tapert, 625 F.2d 111 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1034
(1980).
67. 760 F.2d at 69.
68. Id. at 71.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(l)(A), (2)(A); see supra note 47.
70. Staff physicians are in a slightly different position than are physicians who function as independent contractors with the hospital. Staff physicians will not have an opportunity to prefer a particular hospital because of their employment situation, but the
other concerns, discussed infra, will apply to both types of physicians.
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Medicare's DRG reimbursement system. Hospital Y considers
such plans of questionable legality and decides against
implementation.
When Doctor A seeks to admit a patient to a hospital, she will
decide whether to have the patient admitted to Hospital X or
Hospital Y. Assuming that the two hospitals have identical services and equipment, her decision may depend on the nature
and severity of the patient's illness. If the patient's diagnosis
corresponds to a generous DRG and the length-of-stay is not
likely to be extreme, the incentive plan encourages the doctor to
send the patient to Hospital X, which will probably turn a profit
on the patient and distribute part of the proceeds to the doctor.
If the patient's condition is less favorable and the DRG reimbursement low in relation to treatment cost, Doctor A will not
care where the patient is sent because it will not affect her income at either location. 71 Because the incentive plans only become effective if a doctor's discharges result in profits for the
hospital,72 a patient who incurs costs in excess of the DRG reimbursement will not trigger the incentive plan. 73
Such behavior by physicians may create a windfall for Hospital X, which provided an incentive for its physicians to admit
their less seriously ill patients. At the same time, other hospitals
in the area, like Hospital Y, will be burdened by a larger proportion of more seriously ill patients with longer lengths-of-stay.
These other hospitals might respond by setting up their own incentive plans. If all hospitals set up incentive plans, however,
the variations among the plans utilized would still induce physicians to refer patients to particular institutions. As each plan is
likely to attract different physicians, the industrywide implementation of such plans will not discourage financially motivated referrals. Moreover, the likelihood of all hospitals implementing such plans is slight. Because many hospitals are facing
bankruptcy,7" few will be able to implement a plan that will re71. This assumes the incentive plan does not provide sanctions for overutilization.
One type of incentive plan, described by the AHA, would induce Doctor A to send her
sicker patients to Hospital Y. Under this type of plan, the hospital pays a flat monthly
fee to those physicians who on the whole have reduced their patients' length-of-stay by
one day. Under this scheme, physicians would jeopardize their chances of receiving incentive payments if they admitted patients who might stay in the hospital in excess of a
"normal" length-of-stay in relation to their diagnosis. Select Legal Advisory Comm. on
Medicare, Office of Legal & Regulatory Affairs, AHA, Medicare-Medicaid Antifraud and
Abuse Amendments: Application to Hospital Activities Under the Medicare Prospective
Payment System 10 (Feb. 1985) (copy on file with U. M1cH. J.L. REF.).
72. See supra notes 31 & 33 and accompanying text.
73. Id.
74. Cf. supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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duce the margin of profit, leaving the hospital with little to use
in simply maintaining solvency.
The potential effects of incentive plans on admissions directly
conflict with the language of the Fraud and Abuse Amendments
to the Medicare Act. The statute proscribes remuneration intended to induce referrals. In the example considered above, if
Doctor A sends her profitable patients to Hospital X because of
the incentive plan, the hospital has induced that referral.
The primary obstacle to finding a violation of this provision,
then, is proof that the inducement is intentional. 711 Thus, fact
patterns and circumstances are likely to be determinative in
evaluating any particular plan. Nevertheless, the fact that incentive plans induce selective referrals will be readily apparent in
any situation in which a physician has a choice of where to admit a particular patient.

C.

"Knowingly and Willfully"

The fraud and abuse provisions further require that remuneration be knowing and willful in order to constitute a crime. Thus
the statute is aimed at those who intentionally violate the
prohibitions of the Amendments. 76
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(l)-(2) (1985); see supra note 47.
76. Knowingly and willfully is most commonly used in a criminal context and is variously defined. See United States v. McKim, 26 F. Cas. 1122, 1122 (W.D. Pa. 1869) (No.
15,693) (The court held that under an act that required the violation be knowing and
willful, intent to defraud is not necessary. "The penalty is incurred, the offense complete,
when the defendants 'have left undone those things which they ought to have done' ('and
done things which they ought not to have done'), and this without any fraudulent or
criminal intent."); United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482 (1868). In Kirby, the Court stated
that knowingly and willfully applies
to those who know that the acts performed will have that effect, and perform
them with the intention that such shall be their operation. When the acts which
create [the statutory violation] are in themselves unlawful, the intention [to violate the statute] will be imputed ... although the attainment of other ends may
have been his primary object.
Id. at 485-86. In United States v. Fifty Waltham Watch Movements, 139 F. 291
(N.D.N.Y. 1905), the court stated:
'Knowingly' is frequently used ... in contradistinction to 'innocently,' 'ignorantly,' or 'unintentionally.'...
. . . Conceding that to constitute a criminal offense in violating a statute there
must be 'a criminal intent,' or a 'bad mind,' it seems clear to this court that,
where the statute offended against fails to specify a particular intent as the one
which must exist in order to make the doing of the act criminal, the knowing
and willful violation of the statute (if not justified) for some personal end or gain
shows the bad mind and establishes the criminal intent.
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Hospitals clearly can foresee, and may deliberately encourage,
the potential inducement of referrals when setting up incentive
plans. That incentive plans encourage physicians to admit patients selectively must be obvious to hospital administrators. 77
Clearly, administrators who desire this effect violate the statute.
But even if not deliberate, when administrators, with knowledge
that the incentive plan would induce referrals, implement it anyway, they violate the statute.
United States v. Greber78 facilitates a more definite showing
of purpose. In Greber, the Third Circuit held that "if one purpose of the payment was to induce future referrals, the medicare
statute has been violated."79 Hospital-physician incentive plans
induce physicians to refer profitable patients to the offering hospital and to order services in a particular manner. The plans reward physicians for admitting profitable patients. Commentators note that the PPS will encourage hospitals to attempt to
admit only the less costly patients. 80 An incentive plan should
suggest the possibility of an attempt by the hospital in question
to alter its case mix by encouraging its physicians to admit certain types of patients. Nevertheless, even if a purpose to induce
referrals could not be proven, a purpose to induce physicians to
order or arrange for particular services or goods is evident on the
face of the plans. The basic philosophy behind such plans is that
physicians will administer cost-effective care if paid to do so.
Id. at 300 (citing United States v. Claypool, 14 F. 127 (W.D. Mo. 1882)); see also W.
LAFAVE & A. ScOTI, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW§ 28, at 196 (1972) (footnotes omitted):
[For] crimes which require that the defendant intentionally cause a specific result ... it is now generally accepted that a person who acts ... intends a result
of his act ... under two quite different circumstances: (1) when he consciously
desires that result ... ; and (2) when he knows that that result is practically
certain to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result.
But see Elfbrandt v. Russell, 97 Ariz. 140, 145-46, 397 P.2d 944, 947 (1964) ("evil motive" necessary or act committed voluntarily and purposefully), rev'd on other grounds,
384 U.S. 11 (1966); State ex rel. Grover v. Grover, 158 Or. 635, 639-40, 77 P.2d 430, 432
(1938) ("determination with a bad intent" needed) (citing Felton v. United States, 96
U.S. 699, 702 (1877)).
77. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
78. 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 396 (1985). For a discussion of
Greber, see supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
79. Id. at 69 (emphasis added).
80. Sorkin suggests that the PPS should serve as a disincentive for hospitals to increase patient volume because no additional profits would result from the additional patients admitted. However, if the hospital could alter its case mix, that is, if it could get a
disproportionate number of profitable patients, the hospital would beat the PPS and
increased profits would result. A. SORKIN, supra note 14, at 45-47; Comment, Provider
Liability Under Public Law 98-21: The Medicare Prospective Payment System in Light
of Wickline v. State, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 1011, 1018-19 (1985).
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The rewards are intended to influence the behavior of physicians
in caring for patients. 81

III.

ABUSES AND THREATS TO QUALITY HEALTH CARE

Hospital administrators' implementation of incentive plans is
designed to ensure the economic well-being of the hospital. 82
Ideally, under such a plan, each patient would receive only the
care necessary to treat his or her diagnosed condition. Increased
efficiency in the health care industry would reduce waste in the
Medicare program. In other words, the purpose of the incentive
plans is increased efficiency within the system, an indisputably
admirable goal in light of the escalating financial difficulties the
Medicare system faces. 83 Thus, because the primary purpose of
the DRG system is to decrease health care costs,8 " one might
argue that incentive plans further the will of Congress rather
than frustrate it.
Congress' primary concern when enacting the Fraud and
Abuse Amendments, as evidenced in the legislative histories,
was that money not necessary for patient care not be taken out
of the Medicare and Medicaid systems. 86 Incentive plans do not
appear to frustrate this concern. On their face, incentive plans
have no effect whatsoever on amounts of Medicare funds paid to
hospitals. 86 Regardless of the implementation of incentive plans,
hospitals receive only those funds authorized under a particular
DRG. This fact, together with the efficiency arguments,87 sug81. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text and text accompanying notes 3435.
82. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
85. See infra note 92.
86. Note, supra note 31, at 766, suggests that without "deception" or "waste" in hospital-physician incentive plans, no violation of the fraud and abuse provisions exists.
.. This suggestion, however, is simply incorrect. As to "deception," the statute applies
whether the action is overt or covert. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(l)-(2) (1982). And, as to
"waste," increased cost to the Medicare program is not an essential element of a fraud
and abuse violation. See United States v. Ruttenberg, 625 F.2d 173, 177 (7th Cir. 1980).
In Legal Aspects of Health Care Reimbursement, the authors suggest that kickbacks
may be permissible if the cost to Medicare is not increased, R. BUCHANAN & J. MINOR,
supra note 17, at 133. The clear statutory language of the fraud and abuse statute, however, does not support their contention. Furthermore, although the actual payment to
the physician does not increase the costs to the Medicare program, manipulation of the
system by physicians, which the plans themselves encourage, will result in a substantial
drain on Medicare.
87. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
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gests the attractiveness of incentive plans as a means of fulfilling
the PPS goal of cost containment.
The potential for fraud and abuse in implementation of the
incentive plans, however, outweighs the possible cost-effectiveness of the plans. Regardless of whether the plans are, in theory,
cost-effective, they promote fraudulent and abusive practices
that defeat cost containment. Among the fraudulent or abusive
practices these plans promote is "DRG creep," whereby doctors
assign more "profitable" DRGs to "unprofitable" patients. Incentive plans also encourage the deliberate early discharge and
readmission of the same patient. Through this practice, the hospital receives additional Medicare reimbursement as a result of
two DRGs being assigned: one DRG on the initial admission and
a second on the readmission. More tragically, incentive plans
will produce an adverse impact on quality of care.
A.

Fraudulent and Abusive Practices

In enacting the Fraud and Abuse Amendments, Congress
sought to limit the use of Medicare funds to their intended purpose-providing a safety net of necessary medical care for the
elderly.BB The primary purpose of the amendments was "to
strengthen the ability of the Federal and State governments to
find and correct abuse and to detect and prosecute fraud."B 9
Fraud, according to the legislative history, is a purposeful attempt to receive an unauthorized benefit through an intentional
deception or misrepresentation. 90 Program abuse is less clearly
defined but includes activities "inconsistent with accepted sound
medical or business practices resulting in excessive and unreasonable financial cost to either medicare or medicaid."91 Con88. 1 Medicare and Medicaid Frauds Hearing, supra note 62, at 7 (statement of Sen.
Church).
89. H.R. REP. No. 393, supra note 62, at 48, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CoNG. & Ao.
NEWS at 3050.
90. Id.
91. Id.; see also Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud Act: Hearing on H.R. 15536, H.R.
13347, H.R. 14805, H.R. 6483, and H.R. 6623 Before the Subcomm. on Health and the
Environment of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d

Sess. 81-82 (1976) (statement of Beverlee A. Myers, Lecturer, Department of Medical
Care Org., School of Pub. Health, University of Mich.) (quoting STAFF OF THE SuBCOMM.
ON HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE. 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., A DISCURSIVE DICTIONARY OF HEALTH CARE 5 (Comm.
Print 1976)):
[A)buse is defined as "improper or excessive use of program benefits, resources
or services by either providers or consumers. Abuse can occur intentionally or
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gress designed the amendments to cover those persons who defraud or abuse the Medicare and Medicaid programs for
personal gain. 92
The AMA's opposition to incentive plans93 poses a substantial
challenge to any argument that the plans do not constitute
abuse because they comport with "accepted sound medical . . .
practices." The AMA believed that the plan it evaluated gave
doctors an incentive to admit those patients more appropriately
treated at a less costly facility or as outpatients. 9 "
The AMA espoused three reasons for opposing the particular
incentive plan. First, the plan subverted the Medicare system by
undercutting the premise that a random sample of patients will
be admitted to each acute care hospital. 911 If greater numbers of
patients with "profitable" DRGs are admitted to hospitals with
incentive plans, other area hospitals are likely to receive those
patients with "unprofitable" DRGs. Thus, the other area hospitals will not have the same "break even" potential as hospitals
with incentive plans. Second, the AMA feared the plan would
increase the number of patients transferred out of hospitals with
incentive plans to other area hospitals. 96 Third, such plans
would undercut peer review organizations' (PROs) 97 monitoring
unintentionally, when services are used which are excessive or unnecessary;
which are not the appropriate treatment for the patient's condition . . . . It
should be distinguished from fraud, in which deliberate deceit is used by providers or consumers .... Abuse is not necessarily either intentional or illegal."
92. "When Congress passed the Medicare/Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments of 1977, it was our hope that we wouldn't have to keep hearing about millions of
lost Federal dollars.... [l]t is evident that millions, and perhaps billions, of dollars are
still being wasted in our medicare and medicaid programs." Medicare & Medicaid
Fraud: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and Long-Term Care of the House
Select Comm. on Aging, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980) (statement of Rep. Abdnor); 1
Medicare and Medicaid Frauds Hearing, supra note 62, at 4 (statement of Sen. Percy).
93. The AMA expressed its opposition to incentive plans in a letter to the Department of Health and Human Services regarding the Hollywood Community Hospital plan,
see Richman, supra note 26, and in one of its Judicial Council Reports, Judicial Council,
Report D, supra note 41. It stated that "the physician is not entitled to derive a profit
which results from services provided by the hospital under DRG payments." Id. at 176,
reprinted in 253 J. AM.A. at 2425.
94. Richman, supra note 26, at 48.
95. Id. at 48, 53.
96. Id. This apparently assumes that the incentive plan penalizes in some manner for
overutilization of services. The Hollywood Community Hospital plan, however, see supra
note 33, does not, from their program statement, appear to do so.
97. PROs are groups of local physicians, 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-l(l)(A) (1982), who review
medical decisionmaking to determine whether care is reasonable and necessary, whether
services meet professional standards of quality, and that care cannot be provided more
appropriately and economically on an outpatient basis or in a different type of health
care facility. Id. § 1320c-3(a)(l)(A)-(C). If the Secretary of Health and Human Services
determines (through information that PROs supply) that patients are being admitted

298

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 20:1

of physician practices because PROs rely on accurate records as
a check on hospital practice. Under the incentive plan, doctors
have an "incentive to rig the DRG system. " 98
Incentive plans are likely to magnify existing abuses such as
"DRG creep." DRG creep refers to physicians' assigning a patient to a DRG with a higher reimbursement rate than that to
which the patient should properly be assigned. 99 Waving the carrot of profit sharing under the noses of unethical or marginally
ethical physicians, who put personal financial gain before their
patients' welfare, would encourage an increase in DRG creep
and discourage systemwide cost containment because the larger
the reimbursement for the hospital, the greater the possibility
that the doctor will make money. 100
By encouraging DRG creep, the incentive plans frustrate legislative purpose. Hospitals improperly obtain more Medicare
funds than that which the HCF A deems proper for care of a particular illness. 101 This countervailing consideration outweighs the
unnecessarily or are being discharged and readmitted unnecessarily, the Secretary may
assess penalties, including denying payment and requiring the hospital to correct or prevent the practice. Id. § 1395ww(O(2) (Supp. Ill 1985).
98. Richman, supra note 26, at 53. Here, the AMA is apparently concerned that incentive plans will encourage the practice of "DRG creep." See infra text accompanying
notes 99-101.
99. See, e.g., J. Griffith, in DRG's-What's Next? Two Views, supra note 26, at 18;
Stern & Epstein, Institutional Responses to Prospective Payment Based on Diagnosis
Related Groups: Implications for Cost, Quality, and Access, 312 NEW ENG. J. MED. 621
(1985); Schnitzer, Physicians and Prospective Payment, 6 WHITIIER L. REV. 863 (1984)
(speech presented to the Third Annual Whittier Health Law Symposium, Mar. 24, 1984,
discussing ways to beat the DRG system). Schnitzer raises the question with which this
Note deals but does not address it specifically. Id. at 868.
100. Lowenstein, lezzoni & Moskowitz, supra note 42, describes the incentives inherent in the PPS itself that limit its cost-containment potential:
Hospitals are encouraged to (1) admit larger numbers of patients, especially patients with easy-to-care-for illnesses and short anticipated lengths of stay; (2)
split therapy for an illness into two parts, to spread a patient's care over two
hospital admissions; (3) unbundle diagnostic procedures, shifting some to the
ambulatory setting (outside the PPS); (4) upgrade principal and secondary diagnostic codes, to obtain a higher-paying DRG assignment ("DRG creep"); and (5)
perform more complex surgical procedures to inflate the DRG ("procedure
inflation").
Id. at 2633. The authors question the effects of proposed physician DRGs on existing
incentives. Physician DRGs, like incentive plans, may further encourage physicians and
hospitals to avoid cost containment by the above described means. See also Wennberg,
McPherson & Caper, Will Payment Based on Diagnosis-Related Groups Control Hospital Costs?, 311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 295, 299 (1984).
101. PROs, see supra note 97, may serve to discourage both inappropriate discharge
and readmittances and DRG creep. Because a sufficient review of the necessity and efficiency of length-of-stay and services performed may be accomplished "on a sample or
other basis" of admissions, 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(k) (1982), however, PROs may not be very
effective in curbing abuses. According to a recent study by the Office of Analysis and
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efficiency argument in favor of incentive plans. Although hospitals using incentive plans may increase revenues or simply maintain solvency, the Medicare system suffers as the hospital drains
from the system additional funds not necessary to patient care.
Incentive plans may also encourage some physicians to discharge patients before it is medically appropriate and then to
readmit them in order to provide further care. Through this
practice, a patient who would ordinarily create a loss for the
hospital because of an unusually long length-of-stay or an unusually complicated illness will provide income for the hospital
under two DRGs: that assigned at the first admission, and that
assigned at the second. 102

B.

An Intolerable Threat to Health Care

Although the Medicare statute has been amended to encourage cost containment, Congress did not intend to make economic efficiency the sole criterion by which to assess hospital
policies and procedures. The adverse impact on quality of care
that incentive plans promote greatly outweighs any benefit to
the hospital and the Medicare system that such plans may provide.103 The quality of patient care remains a central concern, 10•
Inspections of the Office of Inspector General, "It appears that many PROs have not
effectively used the authorities or the processes available to address instances of poor
quality care associated with premature discharges . . . . " Office of Analysis and Inspections, Office of Inspector Gen., Region V, Inspection of Inappropriate Discharges and
Transfers, reprinted in Out "Sooner and Sicker": Myth or Medicare Crisis?: Hearing
Before the House Select Comm. on Aging, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 12 (1986) [hereinafter
Medicare Crisis Hearing).
102. See Lowenstein, Iezzoni & Moskowitz, supra note 42; Schnitzer, supra note 99,
at 864. But see Do DRGs Diminish the Quality of Care?, supra note 23, at 431 {asserting
that DRGs are not the cause of premature discharge).
103. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
104. A congressional focus on quality of care provided to Medicare patients was apparent in recent legislative hearings on quality of care under DRGs. See, e.g., Joint
Hearing on Quality Health Care, supra note 13. Concerns regarding quality of care were
also raised in congressional hearings on prospective payment. See, e.g., 1 PPS Hearing,
supra note 4, at 47 {statement of Sen. Durenberger); see also Matsui, supra note 13; cf.
Do DRGs Diminish the Quality of Care?, supra note 23, at 432 {stating that although the
federal government expresses concern with quality of care under the PPS, it has made
no effort to study the actual impact).
At least one court has shown concern with quality of care: "The payments to [the
defendant) did not increase the cost to the government of patient care, decrease the
quality of patient care purchased by the government or involve the misapplication of
government funds." United States v. Zacher, 586 F.2d 912, 916 (2d Cir. 1978).
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especially in the assessment of prospective payment1011 and incentive plans. 106
DRGs alone may cause the discharge of patients before adequate care is furnished. 107 Because most physicians have a financial stake in the continued existence of hospitals that have
granted them staff privileges,1°8 physicians are motivated to contain costs where feasible. Today, doctors treat most complicated
procedures and serious illnesses in the hospital setting, often on
an outpatient basis, rather than in the home or the physician's
office. 109 Thus, the modern physician has a definite interest in
keeping solvent the hospital that has granted him staff privileges. Physicians understand the potential financial effects of the
DRGs upon their hospitals 110 and will, if possible, reduce ser105. "(I]nstitutional responses to these incentives [of the DRG system] are likely to
decrease costs per case and have a moderate chance of decreasing total health care costs,
but are also likely to have deleterious effects on the quality of patient care and on access
to care." Stern & Epstein, supra note 99, at 621; see also R. Rubin, in DRGs-What's
Next? Two Views, supra note 26, at 8; Matsui, supra note 13. But see 1 PPS Hearing,
supra note 4, at 30-31 (statement of Richard S. Schweiker, Secretary of Health and
Human Servs.) (assuring that the PPS will allow continued commitment to high quality
care and may enhance quality of care by encouraging hospital specialization).
106. The Department of Health and Human Services Regional Inspector General's
investigation into the Hollywood Community Hospital incentive plan is, in part, focusing
on the impact of the plan on quality of care, see supra note 36; Judicial Council, Report
D, supra note 41. "DRG legislation was intended to eliminate waste and stimulate efficiency in hospital care without reducing the quality of health care. Arrangements by
which physicians participate in reimbursements to hospitals, particularly where there are
incentives that may adversely affect the quality of patient care, thwart the intent of the
legislation." Id. at 176, reprinted in 253 J. A.MA 2425, 2425 (1985).
107. The results of a survey of state nursing home ombudsmen support this contention. Seventy-five percent of those ombudsmen responding said that "patients are discharged sicker or much sicker than before PPS." Joint Hearing on Quality Health Care,
supra note 13, at 3-4 (survey submitted by Rep. Synar). Medicare Crisis Hearing, supra
note 101, addresses the problem of premature discharge. See also 1 Quality of Care
Under Medicare's Prospective Payment System: Hearings Before the Senate Special
Comm. on Aging, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
108. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
109.
Of the some 142,000 active practitioners in the United States in 1929, about
eight out of ten were affiliated with a hospital, and about one in twenty-five even
had private offices or held hours for private patients in hospitals. By 1975 virtually no physician would consider practicing without the resources and consultants that hospital affiliation brought, and about one in four of the some 330,000
active American physicians practiced full-time in a hospital.
s. REISER, MEDICINE AND THE REIGN OF TECHNOLOGY 156 (1978) (footnote omitted).
110. See, e.g., Angell, Cost Containment and the Physician, 254 J. A.M.A. 1203
(1985); Ellwood, supra note 8; Jessee & Suver, supra note 26; Johnson, Life, Death, and
the Dollar Sign: Medical Ethics and Cost Containment, 252 J. A.M.A. 223 (1984);
Mushlin, supra note 24; Stern & Epstein, supra note 99; Stone, Law's Influence on
Medicine and Medical Ethics, 312 NEw ENG. J. MED. 309 (1985); Wennberg, McPherson
& Caper, supra note 100; R. Rubin, in DRG's-What's Next? Two Views, supra note 26.
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vices and treatment wherever possible, presumably without taking risks with patient health. Whether or not incentive plans are
utilized, physicians will have the motive to cut back or contain
costs in the manner they feel best. 111
Incentive plans heighten physicians' motivation, induced by
DRGs and prospective payment, to eliminate costs. 112 Thus, the
plans magnify the threat to quality of care. Medical schools and
residencies train physicians to be complete in caring for their
patients. m An incentive plan, however, encourages physicians to
disregard that training by rewarding most lucratively those physicians who provide patients the least amount of carem in the
shortest period of time. 116
Physicians themselves have reported concerns about the quality of care in relation to the DRG program. An informal, ongoing
111. The potential threat of medical malpractice suits may discourage more severe
cases of withholding or curtailment of care. "There is no question that the malpractice
courts are enforcing a standard of care that, because it is drawn from existing practice,
embodies many of the system's distortions and its lack of cost consciousness. One of the
law's effects is to make any economizing move suspect . . . . " Havighurst, Competition
in Health Services: Overview, Issues and Answers, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1145 {1981).
But "[p]otential tort liability is only an uncertain inducement to good quality performance because the likelihood is small that legal exposure will materialize from a
caregiver's skimping on quality to save money." Kapp, Legal and Ethical Implications
of Health Care Reimbursement by Diagnosis Related Groups, 12 LAW MED. & HEALTH
CARE 245, 249 {1984).
For a discussion of the medical malpractice problems for physicians that arise because
of financially motivated behavior under DRGs and incentive plans, see Chenen, supra
note 31, at 134; Kapp, supra; Note, Rethinking Medical Malpractice Law in Light of
Medicare Cost-Cutting, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1004 {1985); Comment, supra note 80; see also
Jessee & Suver, supra note 26, at 6; Note, Medicare's Prospective Payment System: Can
Quality Care Survive?, 69 lowA L. REV. 1417, 1431-44 {1984) {arguing that medical malpractice law is inadequate to protect victims of cost containment). But see Mushlin,
supra note 24, at 18:
Any alteration in practice patterns has the potential for either increasing or decreasing the quality of patient care. Curtailing unnecessary utilization should
decrease morbidity and mortality through elimination of the risks of unneeded
diagnostic or therapeutic efforts as well as via the reduction of errors in diagnosis resulting from unnecessary tests or procedures. If needed services are curtailed, however, the quality of care will be affected adversely.
Physicians making financially motivated patient care decisions may also be vulnerable
to conflict of interest claims. Chenen, supra note 31, at 141; Comment, supra note 80, at
1032.
112. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
113. Lowenstein, Iezzoni & Moskowitz, supra note 42, at 2636 {citing Hardison, To
Be Complete, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 193 {1979)).
114. More intensive care during a short length-of-stay will not necessarily ensure the
physician a reward under an incentive plan. Because each test performed costs the hospital money, the more tests performed, the less available for distribution to physicians.
115. Although the PPS encourages this behavior by the hospital, incentive plans extend the motivation to the physician. Comment, supra note 80, at 1023-26 {discussing
the malpractice issues that result from undertreatment).
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AMA survey 116 reports that sixty-six percent of the physicians
responding feel that quality of care has deteriorated since the
implementation of DRGs. 117 Hospitals discourage physicians
from immediately treating secondary conditions or complications because of the limitations on reimbursement. 118 In addition, physicians are concerned with the possible effects of early
discharges on the health of their patients. 119 Finally, physicians
feel "pressure" from hospital administrators to limit laboratory
tests and procedures that may be necessary to proper diagnoses. 120 Because incentive plans increase the economic pressures
that members of the medical profession already feel, the plans
magnify the existing threat to the delivery of quality care. 121
Incentive plans encourage physicians to put their financial interests and those of the hospital ahead of their ethical obligations to patients. 122 Because incentive plans encourage physi116. The "Monitoring Project" was not designed as a "scientific" survey and is being
used as an "information assessment activity to ascertain the current impact of the PPS
and to identify possible 'problem' areas that might need further study." Report of the
Am. Med. Ass'n Bd. of Trustees, AMA's DRG Monitoring Project and the Prospective
Pricing System 6 (Dec. 1984) (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.); Report of the Arn.
Med. Ass'n Bd. of Trustees, AMA's DRG Monitoring Project and the Prospective Pricing System 5 (Dec. 1985) [hereinafter 1985 AMA Report) (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L.
REF.).
117. 1985 AMA Report, supra note 116, at 6.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 6-7.
121. The General Accounting Office recently studied incentive plans and concluded
that some plans encourage physicians to undertreat patients. See S. REP. No. 520, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1986). The Senate Committee on Finance proposed an amendment to
a recent House bill, H.R. 1868, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), to address this problem. This
amendment would allow the Secretary of Health and Human Services to assess civil
money penalties against a physician who underserves or fails to admit a Medicare patient due to projected length-of-stay or projected treatment costs. The penalty will only
be imposed if the patient's health is adversely affected and the physician participates in
an incentive plan that determines rewards by considering length-of-stay or treatment
costs. The amendment would also provide for fines against hospitals offering such incentive plans if either the patient or the physician could be individually identified. Id.
HMOs and similar cost-effective medical care organizations would be initially exempted
from the amendment's coverage. Id. at 26-27.
The Senate Report, however, does not conclude that incentive plans violate the fraud
and abuse provisions of the Medicare statute and so would not prohibit the use of all
such plans. This Note would go further, finding that incentive plans do violate the fraud
and abuse provisions and forbidding their use by hospitals. See supra Part II.
122. In one scholar's view, medical ethics are based on two ma.'lims: "'do what you
think will benefit the patient' and 'primum non nocere,' or first of all, do no harm."
Stone, supra note 110, at 311. An interesting discussion of the ethical problems faced by
physicians who engage in health care rationing can be found in Pellegrino, Rationing
Health Care: The Ethics of Medical Gatekeeping, 2 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 23
(1986). See also Johnson, supra note 110 (discussing the ethical problems facing specialists in critical care).
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cians to discharge patients as early as possible and minimize the
use of ancillary services, 123 the plans may reward physicians for
neglecting the obligation to provide the best possible treatment124 by taking full advantage of all hospital resources. The
sooner the physician discharges a patient, and the less care provided during the patient's stay, iu the greater the potential profit
in reimbursement for that patient's care. The greater the profit
per patient, the greater the doctor's reward from an implemented incentive plan.
CONCLUSION

This Note has argued that as a matter of both policy and statutory interpretation, incentive plans are not acceptable. The
plans clearly violate the fraud and abuse provisions of the Medicare statute and thus constitute an improper means of maintaining hospital financial stability under the PPS. Congress explicitly stated in the Fraud and Abuse Amendments that any
remuneration in return for referrals is prohibited. Those hospitals using incentive plans must reconsider their programs in
light of potential prosecution and even felony convictions. Furthermore, the potential for decreased quality of care and increased DRG creep greatly diminishes the attractiveness of the
incentive plans as a means of cost containment. By utilizing incentive plans, hospitals exacerbate the existing problems of
fraud and abuse in the Medicare system.
Furthermore, courts, when confronting incentive plans in
prosecutions under the Fraud and Abuse Amendments, should
123. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
124.
It is one thing to entrust your life and health at times of crisis to a physician
who is committed to the practical ethics that involve[] a quest for excellence and
who may err on the side of doing too much. It is quite another to entrust your
life and health at times of crisis to a physician whose diagnostic and therapeutic
interventions are limiled by new regulatory constraints or incentives of competitive efficiency that "place the provider at economic risk."
Stone, supra note 110, at 312; see A. SORKIN, supra note 14, at 89 (suggesting that incentives such as hospital office lease agreements, under which the number of patients the
physician admits to the hospital determines the lease payments, may affect the independence of physicians' health care decisions).
125. "[P]hysicians remain the first line of defense against erosion in the quality of
care. Although prospective payment will give hospitals an incentive to cut the number of
tests or to reduce the length of stay, everyone is counting on physicians to assure that
the patient is not endangered." R. Rubin, in DRG's-What's Next? Two Views, supra
note 26, at 8; see also Jessee & Suver, supra note 26, at 4.
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take the statutory language literally-finding those participating
in such plans guilty of felonies-in order to ensure that health
care providers honor the intent of Congress and that the elderly
receive competent care. The elderly deserve comprehensive,
high-quality care whenever medical care is indicated, not only
when it is economical for hospitals and physicians to provide it.
The courts must provide this assurance to the elderly by strictly
interpreting the fraud and abuse statute and forbidding the use
of incentive plans. The legislature forbade incentive plans
through the fraud and abuse provisions of the Medicare Act.
Now judicial and enforcement personnel must carry out that legislative directive.
Incentive, or profit-sharing, plans invite physicians to balance
the quality of care against personal financial reward. That selfinterest might outweigh excellence in care and influence medical
judgment is surely an intolerable threat to the Medicare system.

-Kathryn A. Krecke
EDITOR'S POSTSCRIPT

Recent Congressional action supports the Notewriter's arguments against physician incentive plans. The Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1986 specifically outlaws payments "directly or indirectly, to a physician as an inducement to reduce or
limit services" for Medicare patients. 126
The Hollywood Community Hospital1 27 has ended its physician incentive program in response to the new law. 128 The Department of Health and Human Services Regional Inspector
General, who had been scrutinizing the hospital as a result of its
implementation of the incentive program, has terminated his
investigation. 129

126. Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9313, 100 Stat. 2002, 2003 (1986).
127. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
128. Telephone interview with Donald Goldman, attorney for Hollywood Community
Hospital (July 20, 1987).
129. Id.

